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Abstract
Unexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality
electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We
propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where im-
migration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appro-
priates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed,
the policymaker must distribute compensation. With respect to propor-
tional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a
few decisive districts and leave higher after-compensation rents, produc-
ing therefore higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts
receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a
rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results
also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration
than voters. Finally, our model suggests that proportional systems may
incentivize the enfranchisement of immigrants with voting rights and that
opposition to immigration is more territorially dispersed in plurality sys-
tems. Basic evidence supports both predictions.
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1 Introduction
A broad theoretical and empirical literature, in economics and political science,
has examined the effects of electoral systems since the pioneering contributions
of Duverger (1954) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962). This vast body of re-
search ranges from fiscal policy to growth, corruption, income distribution, and
even to economic development. Nonetheless, the possible effect of the electoral
systems on immigration flows is barely considered in the literature, although
this contingency is a matter of the utmost importance. Actually, although im-
migration is in many ways beneficial,1 its gains are not evenly distributed and
voters are concerned of labor market competition, access to welfare benefits and
threats to national identity. This was tangible in the latest elections for the
US presidency, where immigration has been a key issue. In the UK, concerns
for immigration have been crucial for the Brexit. In the EU, immigration is
now perceived as the most important issue facing the Union.2 A recent 22-
country survey shows that 49% of respondents agree that "there are too many
immigrants in our country" and only 19% disagree.3
On the other hand, many major corporations call for less stringent immi-
gration rules both in the US and in the EU4 . These companies include not only
hi-tech firms searching for skilled workers, but also farm groups, the construc-
tion sector, maintenance industries and the food services business. Policymakers
are therefore caught between a rock and a hard place, and they have to find
a balance between these contrasting stances. According to the literature, gov-
ernments are often more pro-migration than voters because they are responsive
to corporate lobbying activities (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001; Fasani, 2009;
Freeman, 1992; Chiswick and Hatton, 2003; Facchini and Testa, 2015). Is it
possible that also electoral systems play a role in this process?
If we look at immigration inflows controlling for per-capita Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP), an overlooked stylized fact appears, namely, inflows into
countries with plurality electoral systems are much higher than inflows into
countries with proportional systems (see Figure 1 below and Figures 2, 3 in the
1 Immigration not only provides workers to many industries but, in the long run, also sup-
ports pension systems by contrasting the effects of decreasing fertility rates (see Storesletten
2000; Sand and Razin 2007; Gonzalez et al., 2009).
2See European Commission, (2015). See also Mayda (2006); O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006).
3Source: Ipsos 2016 Global Views on Immigration and the Refugee Crisis. In this 22-
country survey, 46% of respondents agree that "Immigration is causing my country to change
in a way that I don’t like" and only 22% disagree. Also, 50% agree that "immigration has
placed too much pressure on public services" while 18% disagree. Finally, 43% agree that
"Immigrants have made it more difficult for people of your nationality to get jobs", and
25% disagree. See also Card et al. (2012), who find that worries about preserving shared
religious beliefs, traditions, and customs are three to five times more important than economic
competition in shaping individual attitudes to immigration.
4For the US, see Forbes, 09-17-2013, "Where do Major US Corporations Stand in the
Immigration Debate?", N. P. Flannery. For the EU, see the discussion by P. Gattaz, president
of the MEDEF (National Confederation of French Employers) on "Le Monde" 09-08-2015. See
also the report # 26-2016 of Centro Studi Confindustria (Federation of Italian Employers)
"Immigrants: from emergency to opportunity".
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Appendix)5 . This striking difference increased from 1996 to 2014. In Table 3,
we show simple cross-country regressions based on OECD countries over the
1998/2014 period, which confirm that a "plurality" dummy has a significant
effect on per-capita immigration inflows6. Further empirical evidence on the
predictions of our model is presented in Section 4.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
What makes these figures so different? Are plurality systems able to reduce
barriers to immigration? How do these systems shape policymakers’ incentives
in immigration policies?
The relationship between electoral systems and immigration policy is the
object of this paper. While many authors analyze the vote over immigration
policies7 , the possible effect of the electoral system on the openness to immi-
gration has been largely neglected. We study this issue through a retrospective
voting model à la Persson and Tabellini (2002). The idea of accountability is the
cornerstone of this model. According to Persson and Tabellini (2002), "elections
discipline politicians through some sort of reputation mechanism, not because
of outright enforcement". For instance, a blatantly corrupted/unfit politician
would never be re-elected. More generally, since electoral promises are not cred-
ible, voters evaluate politicians ex post. Note that, in line with this simple
reasoning, voters look backward, not forward: accountability is essentially ret-
rospective. This behavior can be formally described by assuming that voters
re-appoint the incumbent policymaker if and only if they are provided with a
pre-determined reservation utility.
Retrospective voting has been studied extensively since the seminal work of
Key (1966), and several authors over the last decades found evidence that voters
reward incumbent politicians for good economic performances and punish them
for bad economic performances (see Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Markus,
1988). Wolfers (2013) and, more recently, Drago et al. (2017) confirm the
robustness of this finding8.
In our version of the Persson-Tabellini framework, a rent-seeking policy-
maker uses immigration to increase the fiscal base he can appropriate. In prac-
tice, as argued above, politicians benefit from immigration mainly thanks to
lobbying activities. Since for our purposes it is indifferent whether rents come
from tax appropriation or from lobbying, we assume for simplicity direct tax
appropriation by the policymaker. The latter, however, cannot set immigration
5Source: OECD Online Statistics (2017). The charts in figure 1 show the immigration
inflows for each dollar of GDP pro capite.
6The list of our countries is in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are in Table 2. Our dependent
variable is the per-capita immigration inflow. Our explanatory variables include a dummy for
the electoral system, standard indicators of per-capita income and economic development,
controls for the demographic structure and for several institutional characteristics, such as
former colonial empires and the rules that grant citizenship. In the appendix, we also perform
standard robustness checks.
7See Benhabib, (1996); Dolmas and Huffman, (2004); Facchini and Mayda, (2008); Russo,
(2011); Bohn and Lopez-Velasco, (2019).
8 In addition, experimental evidence shows that individuals over-condition on the observed
outcomes their inferences regarding the leader’s effort (Petty and Weber, 2007).
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as he pleases. In our model, immigration damages the voters by causing con-
gestion of public goods. To be reappointed, the policymaker must compensate
his electoral base for this congestion. The net benefits available after distribut-
ing compensation depend on the electoral system. Plurality systems make it
possible to compensate only a few "decisive" voters,9 and this allows to retain
higher after-compensation rents for any immigration inflow. This explains why
plurality systems can be more open to immigration.
Another important feature of our model is that compensation occurs either
through locally provided public goods (henceforth "public goods") or through
non-targetable, wide-ranging welfare programs that benefit individuals based
on their personal characteristics (henceforth "transfers").10 Therefore, we can
also address the bias in public expenditures introduced by electoral systems. In
line with many authors, we find that proportional systems bias spending toward
extensive, non geographically-targeted transfer programs, which better fit the
need to secure larger majorities.11 However, we point out that immigration may
overcome this bias. The overcoming occurs because it is hard to deny transfers
on the basis of nationality: immigrants with the same characteristics as the
natives cannot be discriminated against forever. The leakage of transfers to non-
voting immigrants has some interesting consequences; actually, it reduces the
policymaker’s rent without any electoral advantage. Therefore, a policymaker
who likes popularity may try to extend the voting franchise to immigrants. Note
that this would be less effective in a plurality system, where only the immigrants
residing in the decisive districts receive some benefits in the form of increased
public goods. Thus, granting voting rights in the proportional system dominates
granting voting rights in the plurality system.
This result provides us with an additional prediction, namely, proportional
systems could favor voting enfranchisement. We checked whether access to
voting rights for immigrants is easier under proportional representation. In the
OECD, immigrants have voting rights in 74% of countries with proportional
systems and in 36% of countries with plurality systems (see Table 4). The
possibility of using enfranchisement to gain immigrants’ vote can be considered
another form of the Curley effect put forward by Glaeser and Shleifer (2005): the
incumbent policymaker strategically grants voting rights to enlarge his political
base.
9This mechanism is better explained in section 2.3.
10Although there is no general agreement on this notation (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, argue
that targetable expenditures should more properly be defined as pork-barrel spending), these
definitions are often adopted in the literature (see, for example, Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002).
According to Persson (2002), what matters is that some expenditures can be targeted to
specific areas, while others cannot. The specific form of targeting is not important.
11See Persson, (2004) and (2002); Persson and Tabellini, (2002); Lizzeri and Persico, (2001);
Milesi-Ferretti et al., (2002); Grossman and Helpman, (2009); Ticchi and Vindigni, (2009);
Breunig and Busemeyer, (2012); Chang, Kayser and Rogowski, (2008); Gagliarducci, Nan-
nicini and Naticchioni, (2011). According to Iversen and Soskice (2006), the bias of propor-
tional systems towards transfers is reinforced by the fact that left-leaning governments are
more likely to be formed under proportional rules. Jurado and Leòn (2017) show that the
concentration of transfers recipients in certain regions can reduce the bias of plurality systems
towards public goods.
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Our approach based on rent-seeking and compensation brings to light an-
other consequence, namely, the need to compensate only decisive districts im-
plies that the others receive no compensation at all. In this sense, there is an
excess of immigration. Actually, since in both electoral systems non-decisive
districts are disregarded, there will always exist an excess of immigration. This
distortion is particularly serious in the plurality system, where only the voters
of few decisive districts are compensated.
Summarizing, our model accounts for several stylized facts: it explains why
governments tend to be more pro-immigration than voters; why plurality sys-
tems allow for more immigration; why proportional systems seem to encourage
voting enfranchisement. In addition, it suggests that large shares of population
are not compensated for the costs of immigration, and this could help to explain
the anti-immigration sentiment in the public opinion.
Our result concerning the greater openness of the plurality system is anal-
ogous to a finding in Morelli and Negri (2017). These authors study the rela-
tionship between electoral systems and immigration through a model based on
Austen-Smith (2000). In their framework, the plurality system implements the
median voter’s preference and the proportional system requires a coalition of
two parties. Another fundamental difference from our approach is that, while in
Morelli and Negri (2017) wage competition by immigrants is crucial, our model
does not rely on this elusive effect.12 In addition, Morelli and Negri (2017) take
the partition of resources accruing to immigrants and natives as given. As we
have stressed above, the choice over the redistribution of the fiscal base made
available by immigration is at the core of our contribution.
The radical differences we have outlined make Morelli and Negri (2017)
highly complementary to this paper. In particular, the affinity of the result
about the greater openness to immigration in the plurality system suggests that
this finding is not ad hoc and can be supported by different theoretical back-
grounds13 . This is even more important, since an accurate empirical verification
requires a long-term effort of data collection.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present our ret-
rospective voting model; section 3 presents the results; section 4 discusses some
testable implications and some empirical support for our findings; section 5
concludes. The proofs are shown in the Appendix.
12See the 30-year still unsettled debate pioneered by Card (1990) and continued by many
prominent contributions, like Ottaviano and Peri, (2012); Aydemir and Borjas, (2011); Borjas
(2017); Peri and Yasenov (2015); Peri and Foged (2016), to mention but a few.
13This holds even though Morelli and Negri (2017) also show that when taxation is en-
dogenous the proportional system can be more open. In their model, this happens because
the combination of extra tax base made available by immigration and higher tax rates may
increase the transfer to the pivotal voter, in the case he is unemployed. Since tax rates tend
to be stable over long periods, we expect that this case is uncommon.
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2 The model
In formal terms, a retrospective voting model is a game between the voters and
the government. In line with Persson and Tabellini (2002), our government
is made of a single, rent-seeking policymaker. The timing of the model is as
follows:
1) Voters set a reservation utility ̟ required to re-appoint the incumbent
policymaker.
2) The policymaker decides the immigration inflow m allowed into the econ-
omy.
3) The policymaker collects taxes, compensates the losses of the decisive
voters14 and retains the remaining tax base as a rent.
4) Vote is held, and the policymaker is re-appointed if the decisive voters
receive at least ̟.
In order to improve the intuition of the model, it is helpful to remark that, as
the policymaker sets the immigration level (stage 2), immigrants spread evenly
among all districts by assumption. Clustering of immigrants in specific districts
can be seen as a particular case that makes things simpler for the policymaker15 .
We now describe the players and their utility functions.
2.1 The voters
Before introducing the voters’ utility, it is quite useful to clarify our notation.
We consider a representative democracy that assigns C seats in a national parlia-
ment. n voters are partitioned in different electoral constituencies. The number
of constituencies varies according to the electoral system: in the proportional
system, a single national constituency assigns all of the seats; in the plurality
system, each costituency assigns a seat. In order to simplify the upcoming dis-
cussion, we split each electoral constituency into two equally-sized districts. In
general, a voter i belongs to district j in constituency k. Since the number of
constituencies differs in the two electoral systems, these indexes have different
ranges, which we show below.
Proportional system: one constituency and two districts. Consequently,
i = 1, ...n/2; j = 1, 2; k = 1.
Plurality system: C constituencies and 2C districts. Each constituency in-
cludes n/C voters, and each district n/2C voters. Consequently, i = 1, ...n/2C;
j = 1, 2; k = 1, ...C.
The voters’ indirect utility includes the after-tax wage and public spending,
in the form of transfers (f) and local public goods (gjk). For the analysis
it is essential to stress that transfers are allocated on the basis of individual
14We define the "decisive voters" in section 2.3.
15 In such a case, the policymaker could focus on the districts with fewer immigrants, in order
to reduce the compensations he has to pay. In addition, he could exploit such heterogeneity
to further increase his rents by increasing as much as possible immigration into non-decisive
districts. This is another reason why plurality systems could be more open to immigration.
6
characteristics and cannot be geographically targeted.16 On the other hand,
local public goods are provided on a territorial basis, and this is why they are
indexed by district (j) and constituency (k).17
We denote with ωijk the indirect utility of voter i in district j, in constituency
k:
ωijk = (1− t) + Ψif + h(gjk, m) (1)
where (1−t) is the after-tax income (t ∈ (0, 1)), f ≥ 0 is a transfer, and Ψi is
an indicator function that is one if the voter is entitled to the transfer and zero
otherwise. h(gjk, m) is a continuously three-times differentiable function that
depicts the utility of the public good and a congestion effect due to immigration.
Income is normalized to unity for both natives and immigrants, thus we
assume that immigration does not affect wages. This modeling choice is very
important, because it makes our results independent of wage competition. Since
the empirical evidence on this issue is still too controversial, we do not use it
as the basis of our model (see Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Aydemir and Borjas,
2011; Borjas 2017; Peri and Yasenov 2015; Peri and Foged 2016). For our
results to hold, we only need that immigration hurts the natives’ utility, and a
simple congestion effect is sufficient for this purpose. Moreover, this assumption
perfectly fits the widespread perception that immigration places a burden on
public services reported by the recent 22-country survey cited in the introduction
(see also footnote 3). Thus, the congestion effect also captures the xenophobic
prejudices that can be important in determining attitudes to immigration (see,
for instance, Card et al., 2005; O’ Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Mayda, 2006).
We now specify the properties of h(gjk, m). As in Persson and Tabellini
(2002), the marginal utility of the public good gjk is positive and decreasing;
thus, h(gjk,m) is strictly concave in gjk. The following derivatives describe the
congestion effect:
hm(gjk, m) < 0; (2)
hmm(gjk, m) < 0; (3)
hmg(gjk, m) < 0. (4)
Derivative (2) can be considered the marginal cost of immigration in terms
of utility. It indicates that population inflows tend to jeopardize the provision
16As we argue in the next section, this crucially implies that immigrants who meet these
characteristics cannot be indefinitely banned from transfers.
17For our argument, it is essential that public goods can be targeted precisely. Actually,
they have to be provided to a subset of voters within a constituency: the "district" in the
notation. This requires that expenditures can be addressed very precisely. This is possible
for many important goods, like schools, roads or hospitals. Note that if local public goods
take the form of new universities, they may increase the natives’ mobility, thus reducing the
district’s congestion (Boeckerman and Haapanen, 2013). However, this is a very particular
case, which is necessarily linked to a una tantum expansion of higher education, so we rule it
out.
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of services such as education, public transportation, health care and so on18 .
Derivative (3) assures that this marginal cost is increasing. Derivative (4) states
that a marginal increase in immigration reduces the marginal utility of public
goods19 .
2.1.1 Accountability
How can voters maximize their utility in this framework? Since their wage is
fixed, their utility is determined by the public expenditures they receive and
on immigration. Both are under the policymaker’s control. Since the latter
wants to maximize his rent, he could simply maximize the tax base by letting
immigrants in and then appropriating it20 . This would be the worst possible
outcome for the voters. However, the policymaker also wants to be re-appointed,
in order to benefit from future rents. The voters are aware of this trade-off,
and try to discipline him through electoral accountability. The retrospective
voting model assumes that the voters coordinate on the same strategy; namely,
punishing the incumbent politician for bad behavior and rewarding him for
good behavior. Thus, they set a reservation utility ̟, and re-appoint him if
and only if he provides at least ̟. This voting strategy boils down to setting
the re-appointment probability pvijk as follows:
pvijk =

1 if ωijk ≥̟;
0 otherwise,
(5)
where ̟ is the reservation utility, and ωijk the indirect utility after the im-
migration is observed and public expenditures are distributed. As we are going
to show in section 3.2, at the equilibrium̟ is set according to the policymaker’s
incentive constraint.
2.2 The policymaker
The policymaker wants to maximize the utility
E(U) = γr + pvR, (6)
where r ≥ 0 denotes the current rent he is able to extract. Rent extraction is
assumed to be distortionary; thus, a share (1− γ) of r goes wasted. R denotes
exogenous future rents in case of re-appointment, which occurs with probability
pv =

1 if ωijk ≥ ̟ ∀ i in the set of the decisive voters;
0 otherwise.
(7)
18Pure public goods are not rival, thus, for simplicity, they are omitted.
19This is a sufficient condition to assure an interior solution for the equilibrium level of
immigration. The necessary condition, which is less restrictive, is
hmg(gjk, m) <
hmm(gjk,m)hg(gjk, m)
hm(gjk, m)
.
In other words, we only need un upper bound to hmg(gjk, m). For ease of exposition, we
prefer the more readable condition provided by (4).
20 In the aggregate budget constraint (8) immigrants add to the tax base.
8
The decisive voters are those who are necessary to win the majority of the seats
under the different electoral systems. They are fully characterized in section 2.3.
Future rents R are the reason why the policymaker is interested in winning the
election21 . Note that the policymaker controls the immigration level (m), the
transfer (f) and the public good (gjk). After setting m (stage 2), he allocates
the fiscal revenues between gjk and f in such a way to maximize his rent (stage
3).
Of course, as we argued in the introduction, rents come mainly from pro-
immigration lobbies. However, showing the interaction between the policymaker
and the lobbies would unnecessarily complicate the model: for our purposes, we
only need that the policymaker gets some benefits from immigration. Whether
these benefits come from lobbying activities or tax appropriation is indifferent.
Thus, we simplify our analysis and proceed by assuming tax appropriation.
Remark also that, since appropriation occurs after compensation is distributed
to the decisive voters, the policymaker takes into account the aggregate budget
constraint, which includes expenditures for public goods, transfers, and rents:
t(n+m) = g + f(n+m)σ + r. (8)
The left-hand side of the budget constraint is the fiscal base. On the right-
hand side, g =
2
j=1
C
k=1 gjk is the aggregate expenditure for public goods,
r is the rent, and f(n+m)σ is the aggregate expenditure for transfers, where
σ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of natives and immigrants entitled to transfers. Since
σ is the same for both groups, we are assuming that immigrants are equivalent to
natives. This assumption is by no means necessary, but it remarkably simplifies
our exposition22 . In section 3, we show that the policymaker sets σ = 1/2.
Our next step is to characterize the difference between the electoral systems.
2.3 Electoral systems
In our model of representative democracy, an incumbent policymaker runs
against an identical opponent. C seats can be assigned either under plural-
ity or proportional representation. Following Persson and Tabellini (2002), we
assume for simplicity that C/2 seats are sufficient to win the election. We also
assume that one half of the votes is sufficient to win in each constituency. In
order to simplify the notation, we split each constituency into two equally-sized
21R can be interpreted as the expected present value of holding office. For simplicity, here
R is exogenous. See Ferejohn (1986) and especially Persson, Roland and Tabellini, (1997) for
models where future benefits are endogenous.
22Since what matters for our purposes is only that some leakage of transfers toward immi-
grants is inevitable, we keep the model as simple as possible. Actually, though it is usual to
restrain transfers to immigrants (for instance with minimum residence requirements), those
who have the same carachteristics as the natives cannot be discriminated against forever. For
this reason, large inflows of poor immigrants raise concerns on their fiscal burden and have
generated a vast literature. In Milton Friedman’s words, "It’s just obvious that you can’t have
free immigration and a welfare state." For related research, see Facchini et al., 2004; Kaushal,
2005; Razin et al., 2002; Razin et al., 2011; Nannestad, 2007.
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districts, so that the support of one district is sufficient to win the constituency’s
seat.
In the plurality system, each of the C constituencies assigns a seat. As
the winner needs C/2 seats, he has to secure C/2 districts. With some abuse
of notation, we define these districts as "decisive districts" and their voters as
"decisive voters."
Consider now a proportional system, which can be depicted as a single na-
tional constituency where a single decisive district assigns C/2 seats. Note that
this district includes n/2 decisive voters. In a plurality system, each district
includes n/2C voters. Because the winning candidate needs the support of C/2
districts, there are n/4 decisive voters. This well-known difference is crucial for
our results.
We show the solution of the model in the next section.
3 Solving the retrospective voting model
Since the model is solved backwards, recalling the timing can be useful. Stage
1): the voters set their reservation utility; stage 2): the policymaker chooses the
immigration level; stage 3): the policymaker distributes the electoral compen-
sations and retains his rent; stage 4): elections are held.
Before solving the model, some preliminary considerations will b helpful to
simplify our exposition. First, we remark that, in equilibrium, the policymaker
compensates decisive voters either through public goods or through transfers
(he chooses the tool with the lower marginal cost)23. Then, we clarify that,
when the electoral compensations are distributed through transfers, they must
go to one half of the voters. This makes it possible to simplify the aggregate
budget constraint (8) by setting σ = 1/2, as we summarize in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 In any electoral system, either transfers are distributed to 1/2 of the
voters, or they are not used at all. Thus, either f > 0 and σ = 1/2 or f = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To intuitively understand the lemma, consider a policymaker who satisfies
all voters with transfers by setting σ = 1. In such a case, he can increase his
rent by reducing σ to 1/2, while still being re-appointed. However, if he reduces
σ below 1/2, he will not be re-appointed.
Restraining transfers to one half of the voters is possible by properly choosing
the personal characteristics Ψi
24 . Thus, the aggregate budget constraint (8)
becomes
t(n+m) = g + f(
n+m
2
) + r. (9)
23See the proof of proposition 2 in the appendix.
24 In practice, different criteria for transfers benefit different individuals. For instance, the
policymaker can allocate family aid depending on the number of children or on their age;
the same holds for rent subsidies and scholarships. Criteria for entitlement to unemployment
benefits are another example.
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We can now proceed in the solution of the model. Suppose for the moment
that the policymaker is re-appointed in stage 4 and let us focus on stage 325 .
In this stage, immigration is fixed at the optimal level set in stage 2). The
policymaker only has to collect the tax revenues, compensate decisive voters, and
retain his rent. While distributing compensation, he uses the cheapest between
public goods and transfers. In the next section, we specify the conditions under
which he chooses the former or the latter.
3.1 The optimal immigration and the choice between pub-
lic goods and transfers
Immigration is set in the second stage at a level that maximizes the rent the
policymaker collects in the third stage. We denote with m¯ the arbitrarily high
stock of potential immigrants. Maximization proceeds by allowing entry until
the marginal benefit on the tax base equals the marginal cost of compensation.
Because voters’ compensation may occur either through transfers or through
public goods, in each electoral system there are two marginal costs of com-
pensation. As a consequence, there exist two immigration levels for which the
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of compensation. The policymaker
chooses the method that leaves him the highest rent26 . According to our re-
sults, plurality systems bias his choice towards public goods, and proportional
systems towards transfers. However, we also prove that immigration can over-
come both biases. We state this result in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (electoral systems and the bias in compensations). Plurality
systems bias compensations towards public goods, and proportional systems to-
wards transfers. However, immigration can overcome these biases and make the
policymaker use either public goods or transfers in both systems.
Proof. See the appendix
The bias introduced by the electoral system is well-known in the literature
(Persson, 2002 and 2004; Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Milesi-Ferretti et al.,
2002), and appears since public goods can easily be targeted on the decisive
districts required to win in plurality systems, while transfers are more fit to
benefit the larger majority required by proportional systems.
We add to the literature by proving that immigration can overcome both
these biases. The bias towards public goods can be overcome if too much conges-
tion makes these goods (marginally) useless. The bias towards transfers can be
overcome if their leakage to immigrants reduces significantly the policymaker’s
rent.
By assessing the marginal cost of compensation under the different electoral
systems, we prove that plurality systems produce (weakly) higher immigration.
This leads us to the next proposition:
25As we are going to see, re-election always happens in equilibrium because the voters set
their reservation utility according to the policymaker’s incentive constraint. As a consequence,
he has no incentive to deviate and provides the decisive voters with the required utility.
26This is explained in the proof of proposition 2.
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Proposition 3 (electoral systems and immigration): in equilibrium, the immi-
gration level is weakly greater in plurality electoral systems.
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition is the most important result of our model. It holds because,
in general, plurality systems enable the policymaker to compensate only C/2
districts -namely, n/4 voters- while disregarding the others. This can normally
be done with public goods, and increases the rent made available by immigra-
tion. On the other hand, proportional systems make it impossible to focus on
few decisive districs, and leave lower rents. In such a case, transfers are more
fit to satisfy a larger majority and immigration is lower.
The two systems produce the same immigration level only when both use
transfers. In such a case, the electoral compensations go to 1/2 of the voters
under any electoral system, and the marginal compensation cost is the same.
Instead, when both systems use public goods, immigration is still higher under
plurality rule, where only n/4 voters are decisive and the marginal compensation
cost is lower.
Let us now summarize how our findings relate to the literature. We confirm
two main results: 1) plurality systems tend to convey locally provided public
goods towards the decisive districts and reduce transfers; 2) the benefits of public
spending are more evenly distributed under proportional systems. However,
we also add some novel results: 1) plurality systems can reduce barriers to
immigration; 2) immigration may overcome the bias of proportional systems
toward transfers and the bias of plurality systems towards public goods.
3.2 Incentive constraint and equilibrium rent
In the first stage, the voters set the highest reservation utility ̟ compatible with
the policymaker’s incentive constraint, which we are going to construct. From
equation (6) we know that the policymaker’s utility in case of re-appointment
is
UE = γr +R, (10)
(where r is the rent, R > 0 is the value of re-election and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the
distortion due to rent appropriation). Alternatively, he may choose not to be
re-appointed, and appropriate the whole tax base, which gives utility
UNE = γt(n+m
∗), (11)
where m∗ is the equilibrium immigration level under the different electoral
systems. Solving the incentive compatibility condition (UE ≥ UNE) for r gives
the equilibrium rent
r∗ = t(n+m∗)−
R
γ
. (12)
From equation (12) we obtain ∂r
∗
∂m∗
> 0. By proposition 3, it follows that the
policymaker’s rent in the plurality system is greater or equal to his rent in the
proportional system.
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From equation (12) it also follows
t(n+m∗) = r∗ +
R
γ
. (13)
The left-hand side of equation (13) is the tax base in equilibrium. The right-
hand side shows that the resources left to the voters once the incentive constraint
is satisfied are the same -namely, R/γ- under both electoral systems. In other
words, all the tax base exceeding R/γ flows into rents. In the spirit of the
styilized facts we have presented in the introduction, this means that we end up
with a policy that concentrates the benefits of immigration on the policymaker
and on the group of pro-immigration lobbies supporting him. On the other hand,
the costs of immigration are spread over the reamining population: decisive
voters are kept indifferent to immigration, but non-decisive voters are definitely
hurt. We develop this analysis in the following section.
3.3 Voters’ equilibrium utility
In our model, voters can be either decisive or non-decisive. The latter are not
compensated at all for immigration, thus computing their utility is easier. In
our simplified framework, they do not receive neither public goods nor transfers
under both electoral systems. As a consequence, in equilibrium, their utility is
only determined by the immigration level:
ω˜ND = (1− t) + h(0, m
∗), (14)
wherem∗ is the equilibrium immigration under the different electoral systems27 .
By proposition 3, we know that m∗ in proportional systems is never larger than
in plurality systems. Thus, non-decisive voters are (weakly) better off in pro-
portional systems. Remarkably, non-decisive voters are 1/2 of the voters under
proportional representation and 3/4 of the voters under plurality rule. These re-
sults confirm that proportional systems tend to protect a larger share of voters,
and that plurality electoral systems might intensify territorial imbalances. How-
ever, the existence of large shares of neglected voters under both electoral sys-
tems provides a solid rationale for the formation of extensive anti-immigration
sentiment. We elaborate on this point in section 4, where we present some em-
pirical support for our findings. For the moment, we turn to the decisive voters’
equilibrium utility, which is computed as follows: we substitute the optimal
immigration inflow and the incentive-compatible rent (12) into the aggregate
budget constraint (9). Then, we solve (9) with respect to g and f(n +m∗)/2
27h(0,m∗) does not imply that non-decisive voters do not receive public goods. Rather, it
means that these voters do not receive any compensation for the inflow of immigrants. In
other words, pre-existing public goods get congested, but the policymaker does not increase
their baseline level, which we conventionally label "0". In an older version of this model
(Russo and Salsano, 2012) we show that we can easily obtain a positive level of public goods
for non-decisive voters. However, this would only complicate the algebra, so we prefer keeping
the simpler notation h(0,m∗).
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respectively, and we obtain the aggregate amount of public goods (g) and trans-
fers (f(n+m∗)/2) used for the electoral compensations. Finally, we divide these
aggregates by the number of decisive districts (voters) and find the individual
compensations to be plugged into utility (1).
Since the effect of immigration can overcome the bias towards public goods
in plurality systems and the bias towards transfers in proportional systems, the
analysis of the decisive voters’ utility is less straightforward, because we have
to take into account different cases. By proposition 2, we know that there are
three possibilities:
a) Compensations through public goods in the plurality system and through
transfers in the proportional system;
b) Compensations through public goods in both systems;
c) Compensations through transfers in both systems.
We refer to a) as the "standard" case, and to b), c) as the "particular" cases.
In order to avoid ambiguities, in what follows m∗ denotes the equilibrium im-
migration in the plurality system and m∗∗ denotes the equilibrium immigration
in the proportional system. By proposition 3, we know that m∗ ≥ m∗∗.
In case a), the decisive voters’ utility is
̟pl(a) = (1− t) + h

2R
γC
;m∗

(plurality), (15)
̟pr(a) = (1− t) + h(0, m
∗∗) +
R
γ

2
n+m∗∗

(proportional). (16)
In case b), the decisive voters’ utility is
̟pl(b) = (1− t) + h

2R
γC
;m∗

(plurality), (17)
̟pl(b) = (1− t) + h

R
γC
;m∗∗

(proportional). (18)
In case c), the decisive voters’ utility is the same under both systems, namely,
̟(c) = (1− t) + h(0,m
∗) +
R
γ

2
n+m∗

. (19)
We cannot compare the decisive voters’ utility in case a) because the argu-
ments of equations (15) and (16) are different, and the function h(gjk, m) is a
generic one28. The same holds for equations (17) and (18) in case b). In case
c), instead, both electoral systems generate the same level of immigration, and
compensations occur through transfers. As a consequence they are equivalent
and generate the same utility.
In the next section, we try to compare the decisive voters’ utility in case a)
and b) through some numerical examples.
28On comparing equation (17) and equation (18), we see that the former includes more
public goods and more immigration (i.e., higher congestion), and the latter includes less
public goods but also less immigration (i.e., lower congestion).
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3.4 Numerical analysis of the decisive voters’ utility
Here, we try a numerical analysis of the decisive voters’ utility under the different
electoral systems. Such an exercise is hardly general; nonetheless, it delivers
some interesting insights. We use the following function form for h (gjk,m):
h (gjk, m) =

xgajk − (1− x)m
b
z
, (20)
where x, z ∈ (0, 1); a ≥ 1; b ≥ a. Under these restrictions, equation (20) easily
satisfies assumptions (2), (3) and (4). We proceed as follows: first, we assign
values to x, z, a, b. Then, we find the equilibrium immigration that equalizes
the marginal benefit t to the marginal compensation cost in cases a) and b),
given by equations (24) and (25) in the appendix. Finally, we put the values
of m so obtained into the equilibrium utilities (15) and (16) (case a); (17) and
(18) (case b).
Let us start from case (a); namely, compensations occur through transfers
in the proportional system and through public goods in the plurality system. In
order to understand our results, note that, in this case, proportional representa-
tion drastically reduces immigration.29 As a consequence, immigration scarcely
affects the decisive voters’ utility (16). To realize this outcome, just consider
that in equation (16) the term R
γ

2
n+m∗∗

is grosso modo constant to R
γ
	
2
n


,
since m∗∗ is very low relative to the population n. By the same reason, the
term h(0,m∗∗) is also grosso modo constant: the baseline level of gik does not
depend on the immigration level, and m∗∗ is low.30 Therefore, in equilibrium,
utility (16) is little reduced by immigration.
Consider now utility (15): the equilibrium level of public goods is quite
higher than in the proportional system, but so is form. Since b ≥ a, the increase
in congestion quickly offsets the utility of the public good, whose level is fixed at
2R
γC
. As a consequence, the decisive voters are better off in the plurality system
only at low-immigration equilibria.31
For what concerns case (b) (both systems compensate through public goods),
first we find that the proportional system generates more immigration than in
29This can be understood on observing the marginal compensation costs (24) and (25) in the
appendix. In equation (24), the individual compensation through public goods
−hm(gjk,m)
hg(gjk,m)
is rescaled by

C
2

districts. In equation (25), the individual compensation through transfers
−hm(gjk, m) is rescaled by

n+m∗∗
2

voters. Since there are more voters than districts, the
marginal cost of compensation grows quickly and, in equilibrium, generates lower immigration
levels.
30Note that for simplicity we have fixed at zero the baseline level of public goods (see
footnote 27). Since of course there always exists some positive amount of public goods, in our
numerical examples we assign gjk a positive value.
31For instance, if we set x = 0.7; a = 1; b = 2; z = 0.9; c = 100; n = 900; (2R/γ) = 5000;
and the baseline value gjk = 14 in the proportional system, the decisive voters are indifferent
between the two systems at m∗ = 7.77 and m∗∗ = 1.75 respectively. When m∗∗ > 7.77,
the decisive voters in the plurality system are worse off even though they receive more public
goods. Note also that the equilibrium immigration is four times higher in the plurality system.
Such large differences emerge in all our numerical examples.
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case (a). This is as expected, since the marginal cost of compensation in the
proportional system is now lower. However, the decisive voters’ utility still
behaves as in case (a): at low-immigration equilibria, decisive voters are better
off in the plurality system; then, as immigration grows, the increase in congestion
offsets the utility of the public good. The only difference is that now the level of
immigration that makes decisive voters better off in the the proportional system
is higher.32
An interesting question is whether these outcomes provide insights on the
endogenous demand for a change in electoral rules when a country faces an ex-
pected inflow of immigrants33. In a referendum, the majority would clearly sup-
port the proportional system, which provides compensation to half the voters.
Under representative democracy, instead, the policymaker prefers the plurality
system, which provides him the highest rent. At low equilibrium immigration,
the decisive voters and the policymaker agree to support the plurality system.
However, as immigration increases, the former would benefit from a change of
electoral system, while the latter does not. In the absence of a referendum,
the policymaker continues to accumulate rents, while the decisive voters reduce
their equilibrium utility. Note also that, though proportional systems reduce
immigration, decisive voters are anyway worse off as immigration increases. In
other words, more immigration reduces the decisive voters’ utility under both
electoral systems. This may also contribute to explain the worldwide opposition
to immigration we have briefly documented in the introduction.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section, we present some empirical evidence in support of our model.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to go beyond some basic correlations,
and we do hope to develop a rigorous causal approach in future research. How-
ever, our model delivers some testable predictions, which we try to investigate
at the best of our possibilities. The main testable implications are the follow-
ing: 1) plurality systems should be more open to immigration; 2) opposition
to immigration should be more variable at the territorial level in the plurality
system; 3) the incentive to grant voting rights to immigrants could be stronger
in the proportional system. In what follows, we present introductory evidence
in favor of these predictions.34
32 If we use the same parameters as in the previous footnote, the equilibrium immigration in
the proportional system jumps from 1.7 units to 3.885 units. At this level of immigration, the
decisive voters utility is still higher under the plurality system, while in the previous exercise
equality occurred roughly at m∗∗ = 1.75.
33We acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
34 In principle, there are other testable implications, coming from the possibility that immi-
gration overcomes the bias imposed by the electoral system on public expenditures. According
to proposition 2, there exists a cutoff level of immigration above which the policymaker uses
transfers in the plurality system or, alternatively, public goods in the proportional system.
Such a switch in public spending should be observable after, for instance, a sudden increase
in immigration. Unfortunately, it is not easy to know the value of the cutoff, which should
also be country-specific. Analyzing the effects of unexpected and large inflows of immigrants
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4.1 Openness to immigration
In order to test prediction 1), we estimate a simple cross-country regression. We
use data on OECD countries (listed in Table 1) over the 1996/2014 period. The
database includes economic, institutional and demographic variables. Economic
variables are per-capita Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted real GDP, tax
revenues in terms of GDP. Per-capita GDP proxies for wage differentials. Tax
revenues over GDP account for the weight of the state in the economy, which,
in turn, is a proxy of business freedom.
Institutional variables come from the World Bank’s DPI database (Keefer,
2006). Electoral systems are denoted by a dummy, which is 1 if representatives
are elected with a winner-takes-all/first-past-the-post rule, and zero if the elec-
toral system is proportional.35 We also include dummies for EU membership
and for the presence of former colonial empires, because the Schengen Treaty
could foster within-EU migration and former colonial empires may ease mobility
from member countries.
Demographic variables include the log of the total population, the percent-
age of working-age population, and the percentage of elderly36 . According to
Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004), total population is an important proxy of
development: highly populated countries are usually less developed and less at-
tractive to immigrants. Working-age population is a measure of labor supply
and indicates potential labor market competition. Finally, the percentage of el-
derly is important because immigration could support retirement schemes and
provide domestic care services.
The measure of immigration is the 1996/2014 per-capita average inflow of
immigrants in OECD countries37 . We estimate a pooled cross-country regression
of the form
mi = c+ ηzi + αxi + βsi + ui, (21)
where mi is the measure of immigration in country i.38 zi is the "plurality"
dummy and xi includes the economic and demographic variables.si includes the
-as for instance in Friebel et al., (2017)- looks promising, but that would need 1) an estimate
of the cutoff levels; 2) a series of immigrations shocks that cause a non-marginal increase of
the population inflow at the national level; 3) a collection of such shocks for countries with
different electoral systems. We hope to explore this issue in future research.
35Note that many countries adopt a mix of the two systems. For instance, some seats may
be allocated on a proportional basis in order to preserve representation. We take this feature
into account by exploiting the “house system” dummy of the DPI database, which is coded 1
when the majority of seats is elected under plurality rule. When this dummy is 1, we classify
a country as under plurality rule. Australia, Italy, Hungary, and Korea are included in the
plurality systems. Greece, Germany, and Spain are included in the proportional systems.
36Source: OECD Online Statistics (2017). Working-age population is aged 20-64, and the
elderly are aged 65 and older.
37Source: OECD Online Statistics (2017). For our purposes, immigration flows are better
than stocks because flows reduce the potential bias due to historical reasons, such as the
former presence of colonial empires. Table 2 shows the cross-sectional 1996/2008 average, the
standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum for each variable of the sample.
38We do not use a panel because electoral systems are in practice constant over time, and
their effect is captured by the country effects. In other words, the time dimension is not useful
in this case.
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dummies indicating EU membership and former colonial empires. c and ui are
the constant term and the error term, respectively.
The economic variables include the PPP adjusted GDP per-capita and the
tax revenues in terms of GDP. They are labeled gdp_per_head, tax, and open-
ness, respectively. The demographic variables (log of total population, percent-
age of working-age population, percentage of the elderly) are labeled pop1, pop2,
and pop3. The dummies for plurality electoral systems, EU membership and
colonial empires are labeled plurality, EU, and empire.
The results of the regressions are visible in Table 3 in the appendix39. The
coefficient on "plurality" is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
GDP and total population are significant at the 1% level with the expected
sign (positive and negative, respectively40). The percentage of the elderly is
1% significant with a somewhat unexpected negative sign. However, although
in principle immigration benefits the older population by sustaining the welfare
system and by providing domestic care workers, it is well-known that the elderly
show more pronounced anti-immigration attitudes (Card et al., 2005; O’ Rourke
and Sinnott, 2006; Mayda, 2006). The dummy for the presence of former colonial
empires is also1% significant, with the expected positive sign, while the EU
membership does not have any effect. The negative and 1% significant effect
of taxes suggests that high taxation may discourage immigration, even though
the magnitude of this effect looks negligible. Finally, the highly significant and
positive effect of working-age population (pop2 ) is in line with the findings by
Ottaviano and Peri (2012), who challenge the idea that natives and immigrants
are substitutes. Some robustness checks of these estimates are reported in the
appendix, and show that our results are stable.
To summarize, the available data indicate that the possibility of a rela-
tionship between electoral systems and immigration initially shown in Figure 1
cannot be easily discarded. Now we present further results about the testable
implications of our model.
4.1.1 The territorial variance of anti-immigration attitude
According to testable implication 2), opposition to immigration should be more
variable at the territorial level in the plurality system.This prediction requires
some explanations. If we consider a proportional system as a single, nation-wide
constituency, the half of the country that includes the decisive voters should be
indifferent to immigration. On the other hand, in a plurality system, attitudes to
immigration should change swiftly among compensated and non-compensated
districts within the different constituencies. Thus, opposition to immigration
should be more territorially dispersed within plurality systems.
To check prediction 2), we have used both World Value Survey (WVS) and
39Columns 1 and 2 report the estimated coefficients and the p-values, respectively. Columns
3 and 4 report the estimated coefficients and the p-values when non-significant variables are
excluded.
40Recall from section 2.1 that highly populated countries are usually less developed (Persson
and Tabellini, 2003, 2004).
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European Social Survey (ESS) data for the period 2000-14 and 2006-12 respec-
tively.41 . The bar graph in Figure 5 (see the appendix) shows that the variance
of anti-immigration attitude is higher in plurality systems by 46% (WVS) and
by 294% (ESS).42 This finding is in line with our prediction. However, since this
variance may depend on factors other than the electoral systems, further checks
would be useful. Hence, we control its correlation with a set of other economic
and political variables. First, we run a regression on the following variables: per
capita GDP, the Gini index43, the plurality dummy and a dummy indicating
the presence of xenophobic/nationalist parties in the Parliament44 . Since we
have less than 30 observations, this exercise has little statistical meaning, but
nonetheless it gives some insights.
We use GDP as a standard control, even though there are no particular
reasons why it should affect the variance of the opposition to immigration. The
Gini index is used because more unequal countries could display more difformity
in the attitude towards immigration (we furhter develop this point in the next
regression). The dummy for xenophobic parties proxies for the recent boom of
anti-immigration parties. Results are shown in Table 6 (WVS data) and Table
7 (ESS data): only the plurality dummy is 5% significant in both regressions
with the expected positive sign.
Indicators of territorial inhomogeneity offer a possible alternative as deter-
minants of the territorial variance of the attitude towards immigration. Actu-
ally, more unequal regions should display higher variability in this attitude: for
instance, immigration could be good for top-income earners and bad for low-
income earners. Thus, a higher difference between top incomes and low incomes
could generate a higher difference in the attitude towards immigration. The co-
efficient of variation of regional disposable income is a commonly used measure
of income dispersion45 .
We have run another regression (see Table 8) where both the 2014 coefficient
of variation and the plurality dummy are 10% significant with the expected
positive sign46. Of course, this is far from being an empirical confirmation, but,
once again, our findings do not contradict the predictions of our model.
41Both WVS and ESS report regional identifiers of the respondents. Question V39 of 2000-
2014 WVS asks the respondent whether he or she "would not like to have as neighbors:
immigrants/foreign workers" Yes/no. Question B34 CARD 20 of the ESS (in several waves)
asks "Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other
countries?" (Worse = 0; better = 10). Since the answer to the WVS question is dichtomous, in
order to have comparable data we have transformed the answer to the ESS in a dichotomous
variable as well. We have considered all answers from 0 to 3 as expressing opposition to
immigration. Then we compute the variance of the measure using the standard formula for a
dichotomous variable.
42 In Table 5 (appendix) we report the variance for each country.
43The sources of these data are respectively the World Bank database: World Develop-
ment Indicators (https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators)
and the database of the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis: FRED (https : //fred.stlouisfed.org/).
44The source of these data is the Political Handbook of the World (2014) and the database
of A. Banks (https://www.cntsdata.com/). A summary of these data can also be found on
DPI 2012.
45Source: OECD Regions at a Glance 2016 - c OECD 2016 p.25
46We show only the regression on ESS data because for the ESS we have only 9 observations.
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4.2 Voting enfranchisement
In order to understand why the incentive to grant voting rights to immigrants
could be able under proportional representation, we need a simple addition to
our model. Notice first that, in a proportional system, the policymaker is unable
to ban immigrants from transfers. This fact has some interesting consequences
if we note that politicians like popularity. In our model, the policymaker is only
concerned about the decisive voters because gaining further popularity would
reduce his rent. However, suppose that in the fourth stage -after retaining his
rent but before the elections- he can grant voting rights to immigrants. In a
plurality system, he could at most win the immigrants in the decisive districts
(0.25m∗), who share the increased public goods. The remaining 75% are not
supposed to support him, thus, should he grant voting rights, his popularity
could even decrease. In a proportional system, instead, m∗∗/2 immigrants are
directly benefited by transfers. In addition, the simplifying assumption that
immigrants are like the natives looks too restrictive in this respect: since they
are poorer, they are more likely to receive transfers. This could easily turn into
a consensus larger that 1/2. Thus, granting voting rights in the proportional
system dominates granting voting rights in a plurality system. We try a rough
check of this prediction through a survey of the existing national regulations.
Typically, in OECD countries voting is allowed in municipal elections after 3/5
years of residence47. Immigrants can vote in 17 countries out of 23 with propor-
tional systems (74%) and in 4 countries out of 11 with plurality systems (36%).
Although we do not claim that this descriptive evidence is sufficient to confirm
our conjecture, at least it does not contradict our predictions and is in line with
the Glaeser and Shleifer’s (2005) Curley effect.
5 Conclusions
This paper suggests that electoral systems matter not only in determining the
size and the composition of government spending, but also in determining bar-
riers and popular attitudes to immigration. To some extent, electoral systems
seem even able to influence the voting enfranchisement of the immigrants. All
these findings add to the literature.
Overall, our model is consistent with several stylized facts: 1) the govern-
ments seem generally more pro-immigration than voters; 2) for a given GDP
per head, immigration to countries with plurality systems is twice as much im-
migration to countries with proportional systems; 3) the extension of voting
rights to immigrants is more common in countries with proportional systems;
4) the territorial variance of anti-immigration attitudes is higher in plurality
systems. We hope to develop future research to find causal evidence along the
lines sketched in section 4.
47The type of election and the requirements necessary for voting are listed in Table 4 in the
appendix.
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For the moment, our findings also draw the attention on the role of non-
decisive voters, who are disregarded by the policymaker: These voters are 1/2
of the population in proportional systems and 3/4 of the population in plurality
systems. They can suffer losses due to immigration, but do not receive any com-
pensation. Thus, the incentives created by the electoral systems can contribute
to explain the pervasive opposition to immigration. This is all the more so under
plurality rules, that can exacerbate the territorial impact of immigration.
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Appendix
Robustness checks of regression (21)
Our specification is necessarily basic; thus, we try to improve the analysis as
much as possible by taking into account some omitted variables that might be
correlated with both electoral systems and openness to immigration. Bertocchi
and Strozzi (2010, 2008) argue that laws determining citizenship48 can affect
openness to immigration in the long run. For example, jus soli legislation may
cause restrictive immigration policies because it makes naturalization easier. In
addition, ethnic and linguistic fragmentation can affect voting rules and favor
proportional voting systems, which assure a better representation of minori-
ties. Moreover, fragmentation increases public spending in order to secure the
consensus of different groups (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003).
These issues are addressed by adding to our regressors dummy variables
for jus soli and for ethnolinguistic fragmentation (we use the index developed
by Alesina et al., 1999)49 . The estimated coefficient for these variables is not
significant, and the overall results of the regression are unchanged50 .
We perform another check by controlling for the presence of outliers, which
can be very important in small-sample analyses. When one country per time
is excluded, the coefficients are unaffected. Finally we tried to account for
other possible pull factors by including in the regressors the business freedom
index provided by the Heritage Society (average 1996-2014). The coefficient was
positive but not statistically significant.
Proof of Lemma 1)
Suppose the policymaker decides to use transfers, i. e., f > 0. Since in
equilibrium the budget constraint (8) holds, his rent (thus his expected utiltity)
is decreasing in σ. As a consequence, he will set σ to the minimum level that
allows him to compensate enough decisive voters. When transfers are used, this
level is 1/2 under both electoral systems.
Proof of Proposition 2)
The policymaker wants to reduce expenditures as much as possible in order
to maximize his rents, subject to the constraint of giving the decisive voters
their reservation utility
ω¯ijk = (1− t) + Ψif + h(gjk,m),
with Ψi = 1 if and only if compensation occurs through transfers. Using total
differentiation or the implicit function theorem, a change in m must be com-
pensated with a change in f equal to
48Rules governing citizenship acquisition can be traced basically to jus soli and jus sangui-
nis. In the first case, citizenship is attributed according to birthplace. In the second case,
children receive their parents’ citizenship.
49This index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.
50These results are available upon request.
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df
dm
= −hm(gjk, m) (22)
or with a change in gjk equal to
dgjk
dm
= −
hm(gjk, m)
hg(gjk, m)
. (23)
Note that, since hm(gjk, m) is negative, both compensations are positive. The
policymaker must then choose whether compensating through f or through gjk.
In the plurality system, there are C/2 decisive districts to be compensated.
Therefore, compensation through public goods entails the following marginal
cost:
MCCMg = −
hm(gjk, m)
hg(gjk, m)

C
2

. (24)
Let us now compute the marginal cost when the policymaker uses transfers. In
this case, the transfer that offsets the individual loss hm(gjk, m) must be pro-
vided to 1/2 voters (see Lemma 1) and to 1/2 immigrants. Thus, the marginal
cost of compensating decisive voters is
MCCMf = −hm(gjk,m)

n+m
2

. (25)
Public goods are used when MCCMg ≤MCCMf , namely,
−
hm(gjk, m)
hg(gjk,m)

C
2

≤ −hm(gjk,m)

n+m
2

. (26)
Inequality (26) can be rearranged to
hg(gjk,m)(n+m) ≥ C. (27)
Consider now a proportional system. The policymaker still wants to keep the
decisive voters on their reservation utility. Under proportional representation,
there are n/2 decisive voters. If he distributes compensation through f , the
marginal cost of compensating n/2 voters is still given by equation (25). On the
other hand, if he uses gjk to satisfy n/2 voters, he has to provide with public
goods C districts rather than C/2. The marginal cost of compensation in this
case is
MCCPg = −
hm(gjk, m)
hg(gjk,m)
(C). (28)
Transfers are used if MCCPf ≤MCCPg , i. e.,
−hm(gjk, m)

n+m
2

≤ −
hm(gjk, m)
hg(gjk, m)
(C). (29)
Inequality (29) boils down to
hg(gjk,m) (n+m) ≤ 2C. (30)
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Inequalities (27) and (30) enable us to assess the bias electoral systems exert on
public expenditure. To make it more evident, we simply rewrite inequality (30)
to see when the policymaker uses public goods in the proportional system:
hg(gjk,m) (n+m) > 2C. (31)
If we look at the equivalent condition for the plurality system, i.e. (27), it
is clear that (31) is more restrictive. Thus, the often-found bias of plurality
systems towards public goods and of proportional systems towards transfers also
appears in our model51. However, this bias can be overcome by immigration.
Actually, by conditions (27) and (30) we know that the policymaker uses public
goods in the plurality system and transfers in the proportional system when
C ≤ hg(gjk,m) (n+m) ≤ 2C. (32)
In order to clarify what happens when condition (32) does not hold, we
proceed as follows: we start from m = 0; then, we let m increase. When m = 0,
condition (32) reads
C ≤ hg(gjk, 0)n ≤ 2C. (33)
Suppose for simplicity that condition (33) holds. Thus, as the first immigrant
enters the country, proportional systems compensate through transfers and plu-
rality systems through public goods. What goes on as m grows furhter? In this
respect, note that, in condition (32), the term (n+m) is increasing in m and
the term hg(gjk,m) is decreasing in m by assumption (4). Thus, the net effect
is in principle undetermined.
Here, we make the following assumption: either hg(gjk,m) weakly dominates
(n+m), or viceversa. As a consequence, the product hg(gjk, m) (n+m) is
weakly monotonic (either increasing or decreasing) in m. An example is visible
in figure A.1, where condition (33) holds: when the product hg(gjk, m) (n+m)
is increasing in m, plurality systems always compensate with public goods. On
the other hand, in proportional systems there exists a cutoff level of immigration
above which they switch from transfers to public goods. When the product
hg(gjk, m) (n+m) is decreasing inm, proportional systems always use transfers,
while for plurality systems it appears a cutoff level of immigration above which
they switch to transfers.
In general, our weak monotonicity assumption is little restrictive and rules
out multiple equilibria. It assures that, when condition (32) holds, proportional
systems compensate through transfers and plurality systems through public
goods. In any interval hg(gjk,m) (n+m) < C both systems use transfers,
and in any interval hg(gjk,m) (n+m) > 2C both systems use public goods.
Proof of Proposition 3
Optimization requires that the policymaker equals the marginal benefit t
(namely, the tax base increase) to the marginal cost of compensation. From
51We acknowledge an anonymous reviewer who led us to rewrite our proofs in a more
intuitive manner.
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Proposition 2, we know that there are three possible cases: 1) compensation of
decisive voters occurs through transfers in both systems [hg(gjk,m) (n+m) < C];
2) compensation of decisive voters occurs through public goods in both systems
[hg(gjk,m) (n+m) > 2C]; 3) compensation of decisive voters occurs through
public goods in the plurality system and through transfers in the proportional
system [C ≤ hg(gjk,m) (n+m) ≤ 2C].
In case 1), the condition that defines the optimal level of m is
t = −hm(gjk,m)

n+m
2

(34)
in both electoral systems, thus they generate the same level of immigration.
In case 2), the optimality conditions imply that
t =
−hm(gjk,m
∗)
hg(gjk,m∗)

C
2

  
plurality
=
−hm(gjk,m
∗∗)
hg(gjk, m∗∗)
C  
proportional
, (35)
therefore m∗ = m∗∗. Suppose m∗ > m∗∗. Then, for m = m∗ the marginal
compensation cost should be higher in the proportional system, thus we can
write the following inequality:
−hm(gjk,m∗)
hg(gjk,m∗)
(C)  
proportional
>
−hm(gjk,m∗)
hg(gjk, m∗)

C
2

  
plurality
(36)
namely, 1 > (1/2). This verifies that for m = m∗ the marginal compensation
cost in the proportional system is higher than t, thus m∗ must be greater than
m∗∗ (recall also that the marginal compensation cost through public good is
increasing in m52).
Consider now case 3). Again, in equilibrium we have
t = −hm(gjk,m
∗∗)

n+m∗∗
2

=
−hm(gjk,m∗)
hg(gjk,m∗)

C
2

, (37)
therefore m∗ = m∗∗. Suppose m∗ > m∗∗. Then, as in case 2), for m = m∗ the
marginal compensation cost should be higher in the proportional system. This
implies
−hm(gjk,m
∗)

n+m∗
2

  
proportional
>
−hm(gjk, m
∗)
hg(gjk,m∗)

C
2

  
plurality
, (38)
namely
hg(gjk, m
∗) (n+m∗) > C,
which holds because condition (32) applies.
52 d
dm

−hm(gjk,m)
hg(gjk,m)

=
−hmm(gjk,m)
hg(gjk,m)
+
hgm(gjk,m)hm(gjk,m)
[hg(gjk,m)]
2
> 0 by assumptions (3) and
(4).
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